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THE DEBT BURDEN  AND  DEBT MATURITY 
ABSTRACT 
At  low and moderate levels of government debt, there appears 
to be little relation between the level of debt and its maturity. 
But at high levels of debt,  a strong inverse relation emerges. 
We start the paper by documenting this inverse relation for those 
OECD Countries which have reached very high levels of debt.  We 
then provide a theory of the joint movements of debt and maturity 
which can explain both sets of facts.  It is based on the idea 
that, at high levels of debt, the government may need to decrease 
the maturity of the debt as debt increases, in order to maintain 
the credibility of its anti-inflation stance. 
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Introduction 
When one looks at OECD countries over the last 30 years, there appears to have 
been  little systematic relation  between the level of debt  and its maturity. .  One  set 
of countries stands however in clear exception to this general statement, namely 
those countries which have now reached debt-GNP ratios approaching or exceed- 
ing 100%. There, the increase in debt has been associated with  a sharp reduction 
in maturity. Our paper provides a tentative  explanation for these two sets  of facts. 
In section 1, we look at debt and maturity for the three countries, Italy, Belgium 
and Ireland, which have alt reached high levels  of debt. For each, we construct an 
effective maturity series. By effective  maturity, we mean the maturity relevant to 
the effect of inflation on the value of the debt; thus for example, we treat foreign 
and indexed debt as zero maturity debt (The motivation for such a definition of 
maturity is given by the model  we develop  later). We document the strong inverse 
relation between effective maturity and the debt-GNP ratio. 
This leads us to develop in section 2 a simple model based on the now standard 
idea of a reputation equdibnum  A government which has nomina1  debt clearly 
has an incentive to try to inflate it away so as to decrease the debt burdes  It 
will resist the urge if the rewards are small, and the cost of a lost reputation is 
high. Given that the rewards from unexpected inflation are increasing in both 
the level of debt and its maturity the government will keep its no inflation pledge 
credible  by decreasing  maturity as debt increases Or more precisLi  me 'naxnn urn 
1.  As has been noted by a number of authors (Calvo and Guidotti  l1990b1)  the US have exhib- 
ited a positive relation between maturity and debt, with both  maturity and the debt-GNP  ratio 
decreasing until the mid  1970's,  and increasing since then. But the US appear  to  be very much 
the exception, with most other countries exhibiting little correlation  between debt and maturity 
movements. A detailed review  of the evidence for a number of OECD countries is given in Missale 
[19911 Maturity  3 
maturity  consistent  with  a credible no-inflation pledge will decrease with  the level 
of debt. 
The model developed in section 2 is a barebone model, with a number of strong 
simplifying  assumptions. In particular it postulates rather than derives a tax rule, 
assuming taxes to be set so as to yield a constant level of debt in the absence of 
unexpected inflation. In section 3, we endogenize the timing of taxes by allowing 
for a tax smoothing motive. We derive the joint dynamics of debt and maturity 
as a tbnction of an exogenous sequence of government spending, and show that, 
again, nmximum maturity moves inversely  with the level of debt. 
In section 4,  we conclude and relate our results to the recent research on debt 
and maturity. In doing so, we take up the obvious loose end in our argument, the 
fact that we have derived a theory of maximum rather than actual maturity. We 
argue informally that, once the other motives  explored in the literature are taken 
into account, the maximum maturity is  likely to be binding only at high levels 
of debt. This explanation can thus potentially account for the two sets of facts 
presented at the beginning, the existence of a clear relation between maturity 
and debt at high levels of debt, and the absence of such a relation at lower levels. 
A formalization is however left to future work. 
1  Evidence from three countries 
In 1990,  three OECD countries, Belgium,  Ireland and Italy, had (gross)  debt to 
GNP ratios around or above 100%, a number roughly twice as high as the OECD- 
Europe average. We focus in this section on the evolution of debt and maturity in 
those three countries since 1960 2 To do so,  we construct  two series  for each  of 
2.  A fourth countrp Greece, is fast on its  way to reach those levels. We were unable however to 
obtain detailed enough information on maturity and on Central Bank holdings, and thus have not 
included Greece in our sample. The rough evidence is however consistent with the evidence for the Maturity  4 
the three countries. (Sources for the series and details of construction are given 
in the appendix). 
The first gives the "market holdings" of debt —that part of the government debt 
held by the public rather than by  the central bank or government agencies—, 
as a proportion of GNP. Government debt held by the public rather than total 
debt is the relevant tax base for unexpected inflation. The difference between 
market holdings and total debt is sometimes substantial; in Italy,  central bank 
holdings were equal to 13% of GNP in 1960, going up to 40% in 1976 (through 
monetization of the deficit), and back down to 13% in 1989. 
The second gives  the "effective  maturity"  of the debt. This  effective  maturity is  dif- 
ferent from the conventionally measured maturity. What matters, from the point 
of view of the theory we develop later, is the effect on the value of the debt of a 
change in inflation. With respect to fixed rate nominal debt denominated in do- 
mestic currency, the official definition of maturity is fine. But European govern- 
ments have issued substantial amounts of other types of debt over the last three 
decades. One is price-level indexed debt; we assume all such debt to have zero 
maturity. Another is foreign currency (or, in the recent past, ECU) denominated 
debt; in Ireland for example, the share of such debt increased from 13% in 1960 
to 50% in 1983 and now stands at 36%. We also assume all such debt to have zero 
maturity, thus assuming  implicitly any inflation to be reflected one for one in cur- 
rency depreciation .  Yet another is "financially"  indexed debt, with the interest 
rate on long term debt indexed to a short term rate. In Italy, the share of such 
debt has increased from 0% in 1976 to 31% in 1989. For such debt, we use the 
appropriate short rate as the relevant rate for purposes of computing maturity . 
three countries  we locus on. 
3.  We see this assumption as  a first approximation, which should  be explored furthet both  theo- 
retically and empirically. 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































 Maturity  S 
Ideally, one would like to compute effective maturity for market holdings of debt 
rather than for total debt; the data on the maturity of the debt  held by the central 
bank are however not easily  available,  and thus the effective maturity we report 
is for total debt. 
Figures 1 and 2 give the evolution of debt and effective maturity since 1960 for 
Ireland and Italy respectively.  Figure 3 does the same for Belgium since 1976, as 
detailed  data before 1976 are not available. What is available for a longer period 
of time is the share of long term debt. The behavior of that share since 1960 is 
given in Figure 4. 
All four figures how that the sharp increase in the debt to GNP ratio, which 
started  in all three countries in the mid 70's, has been accompanied by an equally 
pronounced decrease in effective maturity.  In Belgium, the inverse relation  be- 
tween the share of long term debt and the debt-GNP ratio, both on the way up 
and on the way down is striking. In all three countries, the effective maturity of 
debt has decreased by half or more since the mid 70's. It is now very low, standing 
at 3.6 years for Ireland, 0.8 years for Italy and 2.7 years for Belgium compared to, 
for example, 6.1 years for the US or 7 years for the UK. 
Table  1  reports the results from simple regressions  of maturity on debt for the 
period 1960-1989. The dependent variable icr both Ireland and Italy is the loga- 
rithm of maturity. Given that maturity is not available for Belgium for the whole 
sample, the dependent variable for Belgium is instead the  share of long term debt. 
Three regressions are presented for each country. 
The goal of the  first regression is to answer the question of whether the two series 
move together at low frequencies, of whether the two series are co-integrated. 
Thus, it regresses log maturity (or the share of long term debt) on the log of the 
Italy given in figure 2 below to that using the ethcial maturity of the debt, given in Alesina et al. 
119901. Table  1. Maturity and Debt ; Ireland, Italy and Belgium 
Dependent variable: log(maturity) 
Country  const.  log (DIY)  log(ir)  Time  R2  DW  t statistic 
Ireland  7.0  -1.23  0.72  0.34  2.6* 
(-8.9) 
7.4  -1.24  -.17  0.85  0.82  2.9* 
(-12.2)  (-5.0) 
2.5  -0.04  0.86  0.59 
(-14.5) 
Italy  10.8  -2.59  0.85  0.47  ,2.8* 
(-12.8) 
10.7  -2.40  -0.31  0.91  0.43  2.7* 
(-14.3)  (-4.2) 
2.7  -0.10  0.89  0.18 
(-16.0) 
Dependent variable: Share of long term debt 
Country  const.  log(D/Y)  log(ir)  Time  R2  DWtstatistic 
Belgium  .48  -.31  0.82  0.42  2,5* 
(-11.6) 
.48  -0.31  -0.00  0.82  0.42  2.5* 
(-10.3)  (-0.1) 
-0.52  0.12  0.13 
(-2.3) 
Sample period  :  1960 to  1989. "t statistic" :  t statistic of coefficient on lagged 
residual, in a regression  of the first difference of the residual on the lagged level 
and the lagged first difference.  A star indicates significance at the 10% level. Maturity  6 
debt-ON?  ratio; the statistic in the last column corresponds to the test of the hy- 
pothesis that the two series are not coiritegrated. In all three countries, debt is 
highly significant. This is precisely what the eye saw in figures 1 to 4. In all three 
countries however, the Durbin Watson statistic is iow, indicating that the rela- 
tion is at most present at low frequencies,  and raising the issue of cointegration. 
In all three countries, the hypothesis of no-cointegration is rejected at levels of 
confidence between 5% and 10%. 
The goal of the second regression  is to explore the possibility that the correlation 
is spurious, and that the decrease itt maturity is in fact due to the rise in inflation, 
itself correlated with debt, It has indeed long been argued that, high inflation is 
associated with higher inflation uncertainty,  leading to higher risk premia on long 
term nominal debt, and thus leading governments  to stop issuing long term debt. 
We have no doubt that this line of explanation is relevant, and that when infla- 
tion is very high, long nominal assets, private or public, disappear. But the second 
regression  in  table 1, which regresses log maturity (or the share of long term debt) 
on the log of the debt-GNP ratio and on inflation shows that there is more to the 
evolution of maturity in those three countries than  simply  the effect of inflation. In 
all three, the debt-ON? ratio dominates  inflation, both quantitatively and statis- 
tically. In Ireland and Italy, inflation significantly decreases maturity. But there is 
no discernible effect in Belgium. The basic  reason why regressions favor the debt- 
ON? ratio comes from the evidence at the end of the sample. In the late 80's, 
inflation has slowed down, while the debt-GNP  ratio has only stabilized; and, like 
the debt-ON?  ratio, effective maturity has stabilized  rather than increased back 
to earlier levels. 
The goal of the third regression  is to give some perspective on the strength of the 
results by running the  simplest  possible horse race, a comparison of the  first regres- 
sion with a regression of the dependent variable on a time trend. The results vary 
across the three countries. In Ireland and Italy, the time trend does as well as the 
debt-ON?  ratio. In Belgium in which effective maturity and debt have behaved Maturity  7 
very differently from smooth trends, the time trend does poorly in comparison to 
the debt-GNP ratio. 
Overall, the regression results confirm the visual impression given in the figures. 
In all three countries, debt and maturity have moved in opposite directions over 
the last 30 years; the relation is not there from year to year,  but appears to be 
present at low frequencies. This is the stylized fact which motivates the model 
presented in the next two sections .  In those sections, we ignore the fact that the 
relation disappears at low levels of debt; we return  to it irs the last section. 
2  Maturity, credibility and reputation 
Our tentative explanation for the facts of the previous section is the following. 
A government which has nominal debt clearly has an incentive to try to inflate 
it away so as to decrease the debt burden. It will resist the urge if the rewards 
are small, and the cost of a losf reputation is high. Given that the rewards from 
unexpected inflation are increasing  in the level of  debt and increasing in maturity, 
the government will keep its non inflation pledge credible by decreasing maturity 
as debt increases. 
The argument would seem to be a straightforward  application of earlier models of 
inflation, such as Barro and Gordon [19831. It turns out to  be more, and, in the 
process, to be more interesting. This is for two reasons, and both have long been 
known to policy makers. The first is that a successful expropriation of debthold 
ers through unexpected inflation decreases the need for revenues in the future 
and thus reduces the incentive to inflate in the future. The second is that, once 
5.  The model below implies that  other no.intlation commitment devices, such  as the credible corn- 
mitrnent to a fixed exchange rate, allow for higher maturity at a given level of debt. We have thus 
experimented for Italy with different EMS timing dummies, trying to capture such a commitment 
effect, Our efforts were unsuccessful. Maturity  8 
the government has had recourse to inflation, it can from then on drastically de- 
crease the maturity of the debt, again decreasing  its temptation to have recourse 
to inflation in the future. In other words, a strong burst of unexpected inflation 
today removes most of the incentives to inflate tomorrow, and  the government 
can further reduce whatever incentives are left by decreasing the maturity of its 
debt. But by reducing the need and the  incentives to inflate, this in turn decreases 
the punishment incurred by the government if  it inflates today, and makes a rep- 
utation  equilibrium  harder to sustain. Our model shows the mechanisms at work, 
and the role of maturity. 
2.1  Debt accumulation,  debt maturity and unexpected inflation 
We want to capture two aspects of the problem faced by the government. The 
first is that, other things equal, a higher level of nominal debt leads to a stronger 
temptation to inflate. The second is that, the higher the  maturity of the debt, the 
larger is the decrease in the mrket value of the debt associated with a given un- 
expected increase in inflation. We formalize the relation between debt, maturity 
and inflation by the following  accumulation  equation: 
D'=(1+r)(1—m(ir—E7r))D+G—T  (2.1) 
D denotes the real value of debt at the beginning of period t, 0 and T denote 
government spending and taxes during period t, r is the real interest rate, which 
is assumed constant. Next period values are denoted by primes. The important 
assumption is in the formalization  of the relation between maturity, unexpected 
inflation and the value of debt. We formalize maturity by an  index m, which gives 
the effect of  a given unexpected rate of inflation  on the value of the debt. 
A strict interpretation of this assumption is that the government can choose to 
issue a combination of indexed debt —zero maturity nominal debt— and one- 
period maturity nominal debt. If the government issues only zero-maturity debt, Maturicy  9 
m is then equal to zero: there is no effect of unexpected inflation on the value of 
the debt. If the government issues only one-period nominal debt, then mis equal 
to one. 
We  shall feel free however to use informally  a more general interpretation, in 
which m stands for the average maturity of debt, conceptually allowing debt to 
be of maturity longer than one period. The reason why that interpretation  is more 
questionable is that, when the maturity of the debt exceeds one period, the se- 
quence of unexpected inflation over the life of the bonds should appear in equa- 
tion (2.1). This can be introduced, but at some cost in simplicity; we return to the 
issue below. 
In the rest of this section, we assume that government spending is constant, and 
—this purely for notational convenience— equal to zero, We assume that taxes are 
set so that debt remains constant in the absence of unexpected inflation: T = 
r(1 
— m(7r 
— E 7r))D + G = r(1 — m(7r — E-r))D.  We shall allow for variations 
in government spending and derive the optimal timing of taxation in the next 
section; we shall show that this apparently ad-hoc rule is indeed the optimal  rule 
for the case of constant government spending.  Replacing  this expression for taxes 
in (2.1) gives: 
D' =(1—m(lr—E7r))D  (2.2) 
Thus, under this tax rule, debt remains unchanged in the absence of unexpected 
inflation. The effect of unexpected inflation is to decrease the value of the debt, 
and the strength  of the effect depends on m. 
6.  Note that, even under that assumption, (2.1> is only a linear approximation. In particular, it  does 
not exclude that  1 — m(r 
— E it) is negative, clearly an absurd outcome, as the most unexpected 
inilacion can do is reduce  the value  of the debt  to zero. Maturity  JO 
2.2  The objective function  of the government 
Our specification of the objective function of the government follows tradition. 
The government minimizes the expected present discounted value, V, of current 
and  future values  of the one-period loss function L,  discounted at rate .  The 
one-period loss function is the sum of three terms: 
L = (1/2)7r2 
— b(ir 
— Eir) + cT  (2.3) 
The first two terms are familiar. The first reflects the costs of inflation, the second 
the benefits of unexpected inflation,  presumably through output effects which 
need not be made explicit here. The third reflects the cost of taxation. The as- 
sumption that the loss is linear rather than quadratic in taxes is theoretically un- 
appealing —as, in the small, deadweight  losses are quadratic in taxes—, and is made 
for convenience. Allowing  for a quadratic term complicates the algebra but does 
not affect the qualitative results.  We return to this issue in the next  section. Using 
T = r(1 
— m(7r — E7r))D, and  equation  (2.2), and replacing in (2.3) gives: 
L  (1/2)2r2 
— 
b(7r 
— E7r) + cr(1 
— m(ir — Eir))D  (2.4) 
The timing of decisions is the following. At time t, the government inherits D, 
whose equation of motion is given by (2.2). The government decides on the ma- 
turity of the  debt, m, for period t. This maturity is known to people when  they form 
their rational expectations. The government then chooses the rate of inflation for 
period t. 
Except for the dynamic complications introduced by the dynamics of debt and 
the ability  to choose maturity,  the problem we have set up is standard.  Clearly 
the best outcome is the no-inflation outcome. But, in the absence of reputational 
effects, the no inflation outcome is time inconsistent, and the outcome is positive Maturity  11 
rather than zero inflation. in what follows, we focus on the existence and char- 
acteristics of a reputational equilibria.  So long as the government does not use 
inflation, people assume that it will not do so in the future. lithe government re- 
lies on unexpected inflation, people then assume that it will act opportunistically 
every period, choosing inflation every period so as to minimize V given people's 
expectations. 
2.3  Reputation and the maturity of the debt 
Solving for the reputational equilibrium  requires the derivation of the value of 
the loss function under no cheating and thus zero inflation, and under cheating 
and the subsequent loss of reputation. We derive them in turn. 
lithe government does nor cheat  —i.e does not attempt to inflate away the debt, 
both inflation and expected inflation are equal to zero and the value of the loss 
function, VR CR for reputation) is given by: 
VR = (1 + (1/5))LR  = (1 + (1/ô))crD  (2.5) 
The loss comes from the taxation required to service the debt inherited from (he 
past, D. As debt is constant over time, VR is also constant  over time. 
If, instead, the government inflates in the current period, it loses its reputation 
for all future periods.  To solve for the rate of inflation in the current period, we 
solve for the equilibrium backward  in time. 
Once a government has lost its reputation, it will want to choose a level of matu- 
rity equal to zero. The reason is simple: the higher the maturity of the debt, the 
higher the incentive to inflate. Given the loss of reputation, this only leads peo- 
ple to anticipate higher inflation, leading in turn to higher actual and expected 
inflation and an increased value of the loss function. When the maturity of debt 
is equal to zero, debt is unaffected  by inflation and, under our assumptions about 
taxes, remains constant forever. The minimization problem faced by the govern- Maturity  12 
ment is therefore  the same every period. For example, for period "prime", the 
period following the loss of reputation, the problem faced by the government is 
that of minimizing: 
= (1/2)ir'2 
— b(7r' 
— E  it') + crD' 
as maturity, m', is set equal to zero. The rate of inflation  —.--actual and expected— 
is thus given by 
it' = E  it' = b 
implying  that the present value of the loss function from next period on is given 
by: 
= (1 + (1/6))L' = (1 + (1/8))((1/2)b2  + crD')  (2.6) 
Equation (2.6) is interesting in two respects. First, to the extent that inflation in 
the current period reduces the real value of debt —i.e reduces D' below D—,  the 
burden of taxation and thus the value of the loss function is reduced for all [ii ture 
periods. The returns to cheating can therefore be substantial. Second, because 
the government can put maturity equal to zero, it can substantially reduce the 
equilibrium rate of inflation. Indeed, if the only incentive to inflate came from 
the presence of nominal debt, i.e if  b were equal to zero, putting maturity equal 
to zero would remove all incentives to inflate, leading to a zero equilibrium rate 
of inflation in all future periods. 
Consider now the minimization problem faced by a government who decides to 
inflate in the current period. For the moment, take the decision about maturity, 
m, as given. Given that people's expectations of inflation are equal to zero, the 
government minimizes: 
=  (l/2)it2—bit+cr(l—mit)D+(l/(1+))Vc' 
=  (1/2)it2—bit+(1+(1/S))(1—mit)crD+(1/2)(b2/8) Maturity  13 
where, in the second line, we have replaced V'  by its  value from (2.6) and D' by 
its value from (2.2). Solving for the inflation rate gives: 
it = b + (1 + (1/5))crmD  (2.7) 
The inflation rate is an increasing  function of b, the effect of unexpected inflation 
on output  and of  c, the  weight  given to the burden of the debt in the loss function. 
More interestingly for our purposes, the inflation rate is an increasing ul.jnction of 
maturity and of the level of the debt. Replacing it by its value from (2.7)  in the 
expression above gives the present value of the loss frmnction under cheating and 
the attending loss in reputation: 
V = —(1/2)[b + (1 + (1/ö))crmD}2 + (1 + (1/6))crD + (1/2)(b2/öJ2.8) 
We  can now solve for the conditions under which the government will prefer 
not to inflate. This requires that the value of the loss from not cheating VR be no 
greater than V,  the value under cheating. Using (2.5) and (2.8), and rearranging 
gives the following condition: 
rnDcr < b(/ 
— )/(1 + ) 
This condition  can in turn  solved for the maximum  maturity, call it m,  con- 
sistent with zero inflation: 
m =  - )]/[cr(l + )D}  (2.9) 
The maximum maturity is a decreasing function of the debt level .  Indeed, in 
7.  This assumes that 5 is less thsn one. Note that (1/5) is the present value of  one unit" from next Maturity  14 
our model, the incentive  to inflate is  proportional to the product of m and D. 
For reputation to remain an equilibrium  when D increases, in has to decrease to 
leave the product  of the two constant. As long as the coefficient b, which reflects 
the incentive to inflate for other reasons than debt reduction, is positive, m* is 
positive: there  is always a maturity short enough to sustain the zero inflation equi- 
librium. Note also that if  b is equal to zero, so that the only incentive to inflate is 
to reduce debt, then there exists no positive  maturity which can  sustain the repu- 
tation equilibrium; this is because in that case, the government can, by choosing 
zero maturity after having cheated, fully avoid being punished in the future. 
2.4  An assessment 
We have shown that, when a government wants to keep its zero inflation stance 
credible, the maximum maturity of the debt will be a decreasing function of the 
level of debt. We can think of three ways in which our initial model should be 
extended. 
The first is the  relaxation of  the  assumption that  only current unexpected inflation 
affects the value of the debt. This assumption  is correct, we indicated, only if the 
maturity of the debt is between zero and one period. But it is difficult to decide 
what the unit period of this model stands for (time between "policy decisions" ?), 
arid thus whether the assumption  is reasonable  or not. It probably  is not. A more 
attractive assumption is that the value of the debt depends on revisions of not 
only current but also future inflation, with the effect of future inflation a function 
of the maturity structure of the debt. This is a conceptually straightforward —if 
substantially more complicated— extension, which does not appear to affect the 
period on, so that the condition S < 1  can be stated, somewhat loosely, as the condition that the 
present value of the future matters more than the present. We  assume this condition to be satisfied 
in our discussion. Maturity  15 
qualitative results derived above nor to give particular insights 8 Thus we do not 
develop it further. 
The second is that while our facts have  shown a strong inverse time series relation 
between the level of debt and its maturity, our model generates in equilibrium a 
constant  level of debt. Our result is that of an inverse relation  across steady states, 
not across time. This raises the issue of whether we can generate the time series 
relation between debt and maturity which is observed in the data. This  is  the 
extension we take up in the next section. 
The third is that what we have developed is a theory of maximum rather than 
actual maturity.  To turn  it into a theory of actual maturity requires the assumption 
that, at least over some range, the government prefers longer to shorter  maturity 
nominal debt. We take up the issue in the last section. 
8.  We have expicired  the case sere the government issues a combination of indexed, one-period 
and two-period nominal bonds. Then the equation of motion for debt can be written as: D' = 
(1 + r)(1 — mi(ir 
— Eir) 
—  mz(E'2r' 
— Er-'))D + G — T, with m1 and m2 two parameters 
capturing the maturity structure of the debt. The change in the value of debt from the beginning of 
the current period to the beginning of the next  depends both on unexpected inflation in the current 
period, which affects the real value of both one-period and two-period bonds, and on the revisions 
of inflation for the next period, which affect the value of the two-period bonds issued this period 
(which become one-period bonds at the beginning of the next period>. 
In the equilibrium we characterized in the text, it was clear that  once the government had cheated, 
it had an incentive to reduce the maturity of debt to zero. This is in general no longer the case here. 
Once the government has inflated and lost reputation,  all newly issued debt should, for the same 
reasons as in  the text, be of zero maturity. But, after cheating, the government still  has some one- 
period debt (two period bonds issued in the previous period) outstanding. The value of that part of 
the debt can be  further reduced by inflation. Thus, in the period following  cheating. the maturity 
of the debt usually remains positive, and inflation is higher than in the case studied in the text Maturiry  16 
3  Dynamics of debt and maturity 
3.1  Introducing  tax smoothing 
In the previous section, we assumed a loss function linear in taxes together with 
an ad-hoc tax rule, relating taxes to interest payments on the debt. Given the 
linearity of the loss function, had we allowed instead for endogeneity of the tim- 
ing of taxes, the outcome would have been either indeterminate or pathological, 
with all taxes all raised in the first period or indefinitely postponed. To get a non 
trivial determination of the timing of taxation, we thus modify the  one-period loss 
function, which becomes: 
L = (1/2)7r2  + (b/2)(k 
— 
(7r 
— Eir))2 + (c/2)T2  (3.1) 
This differs from the loss function in the previous section in two ways. The first 
and important one is that the loss is quadratic in taxes. This is the assumption 
which will deliver tax smoothing  and non trivial debt dynamics  a, The second and 
less important modifrcation  is that the second term is also quadratic —rather  than 
linear— in unexpected inflation. We make this assumption (which is standard in 
the literature) mostly for symmetry; assuming  the loss to be linear in unexpected 
inflation does not affect the qualitative results below, The government minimizes 
the present discounted value of L, at rate 6. To avoid any other motive than tax 
smoothing for the timing of taxes, we assume that the discount and the interest 
rates are equal, that 6 = r. 
9.  We would not want to argue that the increase in debt in the countries we studied earlier is fully 
explained by tax smoothing. Pan of  it probably is; throughout  the 1970's, most countries probably 
expected the future to be brighter than it turned out to be, and thought  of deficits as largely cyclical. 
Pan of it probably comes from the inability  in most political systems to quickly adj ust to more difficult 
dmes. See for example Roubini and Sachs 11987] for some empirical evidence. The overwhelming 
reason to use tax smoothing as a theory of debt dynamics here is its convenience, Maturity  17 
Debt accumulation is characterized in the same way as before: 
D'=(1+r)(1—m(ir—Eir))D+G—T  (3.2) 
Government spending is however  no longer assumed  constant. G varies over time, 
following an arbitrary but deterministic process. 1fJ It is convenient for the anal- 
ysis below to introduce permanent government spending, G,  defined as the an- 
nuity value of current and future spending,  discounted at the interest rate r: 
G  (r/(1 + r))[(1 + r)8GJ  (3.3) 
We assume that the behavior of G is such that the infinite sum above is always 
finite. We shall use below the relation between G, and G which follows from the 
definition of G: 
(G' 
— G) = r(G  — G)  (3.4) 
We ar  now ready to derive the joint behavior of  maturity and debt consistent with 
a zero inflation equilibrium.  We proceed  as before, first deriving inflation and taxes 
under reputation and under cheating, then characterizing the maximum maturity 
consistent with the reputation equilibrium,  and its relation  to the level of debt. 
3.2  Inflation  and taxes under reputation 
In the reputational equilibrium,  the government does not attempt to inflate the 
debt away,  and both actual and expected inflation are equal to zero. The one- 
period loss function is thus given by L = (b/2)k2 + (c/2)T2, and the debt ac- 
cumulation is given by D' =  (1 + r)D + G — T. The only decision  left to the 
10. Ailowing for a stochastic process,  as desirable  as it may be, substantially complicates the analysis. 
We have been unable to make progress in that direction. Maturity  J8 
government is  that of the timing of taxes, and, under the assumption that the 
discount arid interest rates are equal, the solution takes the simple form: 
T=TR=rD+G  (3.5) 
Not surprisingly, tax smoothing and the absence of uncertainty imply that taxes 
are constant over time, at level TR . Equivalently, they are set equal to interest 
payments on the debt plus permanent government spending. While taxes remain 
constant, permanent spending and debt change over time. Equation (3.4) gave 
the behavior of permanent spending, and together with equation  (3.5)  implies 
that debt in turn follows: 
D'—D=(G—G)=(G+rD—R)  (36) 
Debt increases  when permanent spending  exceeds current  spending, that is when 
current spending is unusually high in comparison to spending in the future. '. 
Replacing  taxes by their value from equation (3.5)  gives the (constant) value of 
the loss function under reputation, VR 
VR  (1+ (1/r))LR = (1+ (1/r)){(b/2)k2  + (c/2)(R)2]  (3.7) 
3.3  Inflation  and taxes under cheating 
To characterize the value of the loss function under cheating, we again  solve back- 
wards, starting in period "prime", after the government has used unexpected in- 
flation to reduce the debt  burden. 
Once the government has inflated,  and lost reputation, it has, just as in the previ- 
11. See B2rro [1979] for further analysis oldie dynamic implications of tax smoothing. Maturity  19 
ous section, an  incentive to reduce maturity to zero, so as to reduce the actual  and 
the expected inflation rates. Having done so, it must choose taxes and inflation, 
Given the nature of the maximization  problem, those are chosen to be the same 
in period prime and all future periods,  and they are given by: 
=  rD' + G'  (3.8) 
=  bk  (3.9) 
Tax smoothing implies  constant taxes at level i  from period prime on. The level 
depends on the value of permanent spending and government debt after the gov- 
ernment has cheated. Because of the  zero debt maturity, inflation does not depend 
on the level of debt, and is positive  only to the extent that the government has 
other motives than debt repudiation for wanting to generate unexpected infla- 
tion, i.e. to the extent that both b and k are different from zero.  Replacing th 
constant inflation rate and the constant taxes in the loss function at time prime 
gives: 
V'  (1/2)(1 + (1/r))[b(1 + b)k2 + c(rD' + G')2}  (3.10) 
Working  back to the current period, the government which decides to inflate min- 
imizes: 
V = L  + (1/(1 + r))Vc' 
Using (3.10)  and (3.2), V can be expressed as a function of, in particular, cur- 
rent maturity, current taxes and current inflation. For the moment, we take the 
decision about maturity, m, as given; the government has only two decisions left, 
taxes and inflation, which, from the first order conditions, are characterized by: 
T=T=r(1—mir)D+G  (3.11) 
= b(k — it) + cT(1 + r)mD  (3.12) Maturity  20 
The government sets taxes at the same level as the level it intends to set them in 
future periods, i;  this in turn implies that taxes are set according to the second 
equality in (3.11).  Inflation is set so as to equalize the marginal cost of inflation 
on the left in (3.12) to the two marginal benefits of unexpected inflation on the 
right, The first is the  benefit in increased  output. The second is the marginal effect 
of inflation on debt, (1 + r)mD times the marginal resource cost of taxation, 
cT, = cT. Solving those two equations for inflation gives: 
—  bk + c(1 + r)mDIR 
(3  13) 
1+b+c(1+r)r(mD)2 
where tR is the constant level of taxes that the government would levy in the 
reputation equilibrium,  which we derived earlier. Note that the effect of maturity 
on inflation is now ambiguous.  To understand why, return  to equations (3.11) and 
(3.12). For a given permanent level of taxes,  higher maturity implies a stronger 
incentive to inflate and higher inflation. But, for a given rate of inflation, higher 
maturity decreases the level of permanent taxes, decreasing the marginal cost 
of taxation and the incentive to inflate. For maturities high enough, the second 
effect may dominate, leading to a decrease in the rate of inflation with an increase 
in maturity. The value of the loss function under cheating, T/ can be obtained 
by replacing ir by its value from  (3.13)  and T by its value from (3.11). It is not 
particularly nice or intuitive, and we do not report  it. 
3.4  Debt and maximum maturity 
We can now derive the maximum value of maturity consistent with reputation. 
We first consider the difference  between VR and V0 for a given value of m. From 
the results above and some manipulation, this difference is proportional to: 
— V  c<  (bk)2(1 
— r + b) 
—2rc(1 + r)bk(mD)  (3.14) Maturity  21 
-rc(1 + r)[c(l + r)i -  (bk)2](mD)2 
Note that in this expression,  only two variables have time indices, m and D. The 
level of taxes under reputation, TR, depends on the initial level of debt and the 
initial value of permanent spending,  but is constant over time.  All the other el- 
ements are parameters. We define the maximum  maturity, m', as the maximum 
value of in consistent with reputation being an equilibrium, with the right hand 
side of (3.14) being non negative. Noting that the expression is a second degree 
polynomial  in the product mD, it is easy to show the following: 
For low enough values of permanent taxes, reputation is an equilibrium indepen- 
dent of the level of debt —the initial level of which however affects the value of 
permanent taxes in the first place—, and of the initial level of maturity. When this 
is the case, maturity must be determined by other considerations than those con- 
sidered in this model. The condition for this to happen is that the determinant 
of the second degree polynomial  on the right hand side of (3.14) be negative, in 
which case  —  is positive for all values of m: 
2 < (1  — r + b)(bk)2  3 15  R — 
c(1 + r)(1 + b) 
For higher values of permanent taxes, there is a maximum maturity consistent 
with reputation 12, 
12. The algebra is as follows. For higher values of permanent taxes, condition  (3.15) does not hold, 
and the determinant  of the polynomial is positive. There are therefore two roots, and two cases to 
consider depending on the sign of  the coethcient of the term in in2, —rc(1 + r)D2 [c(1  r)T 
— 
(bk)2). 
If [c(1 + r)1'  (bk)2] > 0, which is a stronger condition than for the determinant  to be  pos. 
itive, the polynomial is concave in m, and has one negative and one positive root, say m5 and 
rn2 respectively. Hence the polynomial  is positive for values of m between m1 and m2, and the Maturity  22 
The maximum maturity is decreasing  in the level of debt. This follows from the 
observation that m and D enter (314) always as a product, and that starting from 
given values of m and D which are such that the right hand side is equal to zero, 
the product must remain constant for reputation to remain an equilibrium. Thus, 
using this result and equation  (3.6), our model implies the following  dynamics of 
debt and maximum  maturity: 
(GG)=(G+rD—) 
m'  =  A(TR)/D 
where  \  can be  shown to be a decreasing  function of the permanent  level of taxes. 
Thus, a sustained period of unusually high spending indeed leads to a sustained 
increase in debt and a sustained decrease in maximum maturity. 
4  From maximum to actual maturity 
We started this paper by documenting the striking inverse relation between debt 
and maturity in those countries which have reached high debt-GNP ratios over 
maximum maturity consistent th  reputation is given by m2. 
If  [c(1  r)T — (bk)2] < 0, which may  hold even if the determinant  is positive, the polynomial is 
convex and has two positive real roots, say m  and m2  m1. As the polynomial is positive for 
values of rn less than ns and greater than rn2 reputation would appear to hold both  for values 
of  m less than rn and for  values greater than rn.  Using (3.13)  howevet it can be shown that 
values of to equal to or greater than rn2 imply a negative terminsi  value of debt, i.e. a negative 
value of(1 
—  rnsr)D, and thus are unacceptable. Thus, the relevant  root is rn and values of m 
less than rn1 are required to maintain repurstion. Maturity  23 
the last two decades. We then provided,  in two steps, a theory of the joint move- 
ments of debt and the maximum feasible maturity, m, based on the idea that 
maturity of the debt can be used by the government to maintain  its anti-inflation 
credibility. 
In this final section, we turn to the obvious  missing part of the argument. What 
we have derived is a theory of maximum  maturity, not of maturity itself. Indeed, 
in our model, the government is indifferent to choosing any maturity below mn', 
and thus could well choose zero effective  maturity debt all the time, either in the 
form of very short maturity nominal debt or in the form of indexed bonds —of 
any maturity. To turn it into a theory of actual maturity, we need to argue that 
the government prefers longer to shorter maturity debt, with the implication that 
the government will always choose the longest feasible maturity, thus will always 
choose m. Or  we need to argue that the  government, in the absence of reputation 
considerations, has a preference for a specific finite maturity. Then,  as long as debt 
is not too high,  actual maturity is equal to that prefered maturity, but at higher 
levels of debt, the maximum maturity consistent with reputation becomes the 
binding constraint. This line of explanation can potentially explain both the lick 
of a relation at low levels of debt as well as the emergence of an inverse relation 
at higher levels. But are there plausible arguments for why the government may 
prefer long to short maturity debt, or has a prefered finite maturity ? Two lines of 
research on the maturity of  government debt have been recently explored and are 
directly relevant. 
First, a number of authors have emphasized  that short maturity debt must be re- 
financed ofren; this is not only costly, but also leads to a heightened risk of  crisis. 
This idea has been recently formalized by Giavazzi and Pagano [1990] and Alesina 
et al.  [1990], and leads to the conclusion that governments should issue long ma- 
runty debt. The notion of maturity implicit in those models is however different 
from that used in this paper. "Financially indexed debt" for example, i.e. long term 
debt paying an interest rate tied to the short rate —such as has been issued in Italy Matsr￿y  24 
over the last 10 years— has a long maturity from the point of view of confidence 
crises: it only needs to be  refinanced infrequently.  But it has a short maturity from 
the point of view of the effect of inflation on its value, The same is true of  long in- 
dexed or foreign currency bonds. In other  words  governments can  —and do— use 
debt instruments which reduce the risk of confidence crises but are sufficiently 
immune to unexpected inflation to allow the government to maintain a credible 
anti-inflation stance. Thus, this line of explanation does not provide a convincing 
argument for why a government would, other things equal, prefer longer maturity 
—in the sense of this paper— to shorter maturity debt. 
A second approach has been explored  by Fischer [1983], Bohn [1988] Calvo and 
Guidotri [1990a], Calvo and Guidotti  [1990b]. Quoting Fischer [1983): "The 
best of all possible worlds, if governments acted optimally, might be one in  which 
the governments had the option of imposing  a capital levy (by inflating) in emer- 
gencies  like wars". That approach suggests that in the absence of explicitly contin- 
gent debt, there will be an  optimal elasticity of debt to unexpected inflation, thus 
a prefered effective maturity, achieved through a combination of the maturity of 
nominal debt, and a mix of nominal, indexed and foreign currency denominated 
debt. This prefered maturity is likely to also vary with the level of debt. If it de- 
creases more  slowly with the level of debt than  does the maximum  maturity above, 
the  maximum  maturity will be binding  only at high levels of  debt. We find this line 
of reasoning attractive, and do nor see conceptual difficulties in integrating con- 
tingent contract and reputation aspects. We have however been unable at this 
stage to construct a model which achieves such an integration in a tractable way. Maturity  25 
Appendix  Data sources and Data construction. 
For all three countries, data for GD? was obtained from National Accounts, 
OECD, and data for CPI inflation  was obtained from Main Economic Indicators. 
Data on debt were constructed as follows. 
.1  Italy 
Data on market holdings of debt for the period 1983-1989 were obtained from 
Bollettino Statistico, Banca d'Italia, Servizio Studi, various issues. For the period 
1960-1983,  the  source was Morcaldo andSalvemini [1984]. Data on the maturity 
composition of debt were kindly provided  by the Banca d'ltalia, Servizio Studi. 
"Debt" refers to Central Government debt and does not include guaranteed debt. 
It includes only marketable debt, thus excluding  Post Office deposits. Even though 
those deposits usually have a specified maturity, they are redeemable on demand, 
at a penalty rate, thus making difficult the computation of average maturity. 
The effective maturity was computed as follows: 
(1) Foreign currency denominated debt, inclusive of ECU denominated bonds 
and bills (Certificati  de Tesoro in Euroscudi  and Buoni del Tesoro in Euroscudi 
respectively), and price level indexed  bonds (Certificati  del Tesoro Reali; one issue 
in 1983), was assigned zero maturity. 
(2) Financially indexed debt, namely floating rate bonds (Certificati del Tesoro a 
Tasso Variabile)  was assigned the maturity corresponding to the time remaining 
before the adjustment of their coupons. Floating rate bonds bear annual or semi- 
annual  coupons. To take into account the imperfection in the indexation mech- 
anism, the maturity computed above was augmented by the lag —2.25 months— 
between the determination of the reference rate and the beginning of the entitle- 
ment. 
(3) The earliest redemption date was used to compute effective  maturity for  bonds Maturity  26 
with put options (Certificati del Tesoro con Opzione). 
.2  Ireland 
Data on public debt and its maturity were obtained from Finance Accounts and 
from Statistical Yearbook, Department of  finance, Stationery Office, Dublin, var- 
ious issues. Data  on Central Bank's holdings were obtained from Central Bank of 
ireland  Quarterly Bulletin, various  issues. 
"Debt" refers to Central Government debt. The conventional definition of Na- 
tional Debt suffers from double counting, in that it includes liabilities of the Ex- 
chequer  to itself, Thus, deductions  were made to eliminate such double counting. 
Market holdings of debt were obtained by deducting Central Bank and Govern- 
ment Holdings from the corrected National debt series. 
The effective  maturity was computed as follows. In general, bonds for which the 
maturity date within the year was not known were given a maturity date of  July 1 
for that year. In addition: 
(1) The latest redemption date was used to compute effective maturity for bonds 
with call options 
(2) Foreign  currency denominated debt was assigned zero maturity. 
.3  Belgium 
Data on public debt and its maturity were obtained from Situation Generale du 
Tresor Public, Chambre des Representants, various years,  and from Ann  uaire 
Statistique de ía Belgique, Institut National de Statistique, Ministere des Affaires 
Economiques,  various years. Data on Central bank holdings were obtained from 
Bulletin de Ia Ban que Nationale de Belgique.  Market holdings were obtained 
by deducting government debt held by the Central Bank or by the "Fonds des 
Rentes", the institution performing  open market  operations. Maturity  27 
Effective  maturity was constructed as follows. In general, bonds for  which the ma- 
turity date within the year was not known (Emprunt Special, Emprunts Prives,...) 
were given a maturity date of  July 1 for that year. In addition: 
(1) Foreign currency denominated debt was assigned  zero maturity. 
(2) The earliest redemption  date was used for bonds with a put option. The latest 
redemption date was used for bonds with a call option. 
(3) Variable interest rate certificates  were excluded from the computation of ef- 
fective maturity, as we could not find what instrument was used for indexation 
purposes. (Those bonds represented  less than 3% of market holdings in 1985, less 
than 2% in 1989). 
(4) The share of long term debt was defined as the share of fixed rate securities 
denominated in domestic currency with maturity at the time of issue of 4  years or 
longer. 
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